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Abstract 
 
 
This paper analyses the empirical determinants of contract length, a key and yet 
neglected dimension of contractual structure. I use data on tenancy agreements 
signed between 1870 and 1880 in the district of Siracusa, Italy to estimate the choice 
over length and compensation schemes jointly. 
 
The findings indicate that the choice of contract length is driven by the need to 
provide incentives for non-observable investment, taking into account transaction 
costs and imperfections in the credit markets that make incentive provision costly. 
The results also illustrate that since both length and the compensation scheme are 
used to provide incentives within the same contract, joint analysis is important for a 
correct interpretation of the evidence. 
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1 Introduction.
Contracts regulate most economic transactions and, not surprisingly, contract theory
is a cornerstone of economics. In contrast to the large body of theory, evidence
on the determinants of contractual structure is limited and typically focuses on the
compensation scheme only.1
The aim of this paper is to present evidence on the determinants of the com-
pensation scheme joint with contract duration, a key and yet neglected dimension of
contractual structure.
Analyzing contract duration is of interest for two reasons. First, in a principal-
agent framework where the agent works with long-lived assets, contract duration
determines the agent’s stake in future production and hence the incentive to undertake
non observable investments. Evidence on the determinants of duration can thus shed
light on the extent to which incentives for non observable investments are provided
in practice.
Second, since both contract duration and the compensation scheme are used to
provide incentives within the same contract, studying them jointly is key to provide
an accurate picture of the determinants of contract form. Focusing on one dimension
only can, in contrast, mislead the interpretation of the evidence.
This paper uses new data on land tenancy agreements signed between 1870 and
1880 in the district of Siracusa, Italy. The data set, which I built from the original
contract documents, contains information on both duration and the compensation
scheme. As usual in agriculture, the latter is either sharecropping, whereby the
tenant and the landlord share the output, or fixed rent, whereby the tenant retains
the output and pays a fixed rent to the landlord.
The compensation scheme determines incentives for non observable production
eﬀort. While under both fixed rent and sharecropping contracts the tenant’s pay
depends on the realization of output, fixed rent contracts give the tenant a higher
stake in production and hence provide stronger eﬀort incentives.
The length of the contract, on the other hand, determines incentives for non
1Chiappori and Salanie [2003] survey the recent empirical literature on the determinants of con-
tractual structure.
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observable investment eﬀort. Contract duration determines whether the tenant has
a stake in future output and therefore the incentive to undertake non observable
investment that increases output in future periods.
The data contains information on crops’, tenants’ and landlords’ characteristics
that relate directly to the benefits and costs of providing incentives. Crops in the
sample diﬀer in their riskiness and their sensitivity to investment eﬀort. Tenants’
wealth aﬀects their risk aversion and the extent to which they are subject to lim-
ited liability. Landlords’ characteristics, namely their gender, their social class and
whether they live close to the rented plot aﬀect transaction costs.
The empirical findings support the idea that contracts are designed to provide
incentives, taking into account transaction costs and imperfections in the credit and
insurance markets. I find that high powered incentives for both eﬀort and investment
are provided when the cost of doing so is low, that is when the tenant is rich. If incen-
tive provision is costly, as it is for poor tenants, high powered investment incentives
via long term contracts are only oﬀered when the benefit is high enough, namely for
trees that are more sensitive to investment eﬀort.
Landlords who face higher monitoring and renegotiation costs, namely female and
aristocratic landlords who are much less likely to be daily in the fields, choose the
contract combination that minimizes these costs: long term with fixed rent. Also,
these landlords are less likely to ever want to resume direct cultivation and hence
place less value on the flexibility given by short term contracts.
Overall, the findings are consistent with the idea that contract duration is key to
provide incentives for non observable investment. Whether investment incentives are
provided, however, depends on the crop’s, the tenant’s and the landlord’s character-
istics. The results also illustrate that analyzing one contract dimension by itself can
be misleading if the eﬀect of the exogenous variables on one dimension depends on
the choice in other dimensions.
This paper contributes to the empirical contract literature by oﬀering the first
joint analysis of contract type and duration.2 Moreover, in contrast to the survey
2Evidence on the determinants of contract duration per se is quite limited. Exceptions are Joskow
[1987], who shows that contracts between coal suppliers and electric utilities are significantly longer
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data generally used in the literature, original documents contain information on both
contracting parties.3 Taken together, these features of the data oﬀer a more accurate
picture of the determinants of contract form.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 draws ideas on the
determinants of contractual structure from the existing theoretical literature. Section
3 describes the data set and the methodology. Section 4 presents the main findings.
Section 5 reports extensions and discusses econometric concerns. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Determinants of Contract Structure: Ideas
from Theory.
Theories of contractual structure typically analyze contractual choice in a principal-
agent framework where the principal chooses the terms of the contract to maximize
her payoﬀ for given characteristics of the agent and production function.4 In the
context under study, the principal hires the agent to cultivate her land and chooses
two dimensions of contractual structure- the duration of the contract and the agent’s
compensation scheme.
Within the first dimension, duration, the principal chooses between short term and
long term contracts. Short term contracts are one period long, where one period is
defined as the length of time within which the agent performs his tasks, the outcome
is realized and the agent receives a payment. In the agricultural context studied
here, one period typically corresponds to one calendar year. Long term contracts are
when relationship-specific investment is important, and Crocker and Masten [1988] who show that
natural gas contracts are shorter when flexibility becomes exogenously more relevant. Brickley et al
[2003] show that length of franchise agreements increases with the importance of non-contractible
investments and decreases when the need for flexibility increases. In line with these studies I find
that investment incentives and flexibility are significant determinants of contract length.
The literature on contract type is more extensive, both in general and for the specific case of land
tenancy. The findings in this paper are generally in line with existing evidence that sharecropping
contracts are more likely to be oﬀered to poor tenants and that crop characteristics are a significant
determinant of contract type. See Ackerberg and Botticini [2000, 2002], Allen and Lueck [1996],
Dubois [2002], Laﬀont and Matoussi [1995].
3Most empirical studies on tenancy agreements only have information on the tenant (e.g. Laﬀont
and Matoussi 1995) and others only on the landlord (e.g. Dubois 2002). The data set used by
Ackerberg and Botticini [2000, 2002] is an exception in this regard.
4The principal is thus assumed to have all the bargaining power and matching between principal
and agents is assumed to be random.
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agremeents that last more than one period.
Within the second dimension, type, the principal chooses between sharecropping
and fixed rent contracts. The key diﬀerence between the two is that under sharecrop-
ping the principal and the agent each take half of the output, while under fixed rent
the agent retains the whole output and pays the principal a fixed amount at the end
of each period.5
The choice of contractual structure is driven by three sets of considerations or
characteristics of the environment under scrutiny. First are the characteristics of the
production function that determine the need to provide incentives. Second are the
characteristics of the agent, in particular whether he is risk averse or subject to limited
liability and whether he has free access to credit markets. Third are transaction costs.
Below, I use this framework to identify the variables that are likely to aﬀect the
choice of contractual structure within each dimension in practice.
A. Contract Duration: Long Term vs Short Term.
Long term contracts have three main advantages over short term contracts. First
they give the agent a stake in future output and hence provide incentives for non
observable investment. This is of crucial importance in agriculture because tasks
such as tree maintenance and careful application of fertilizers and pesticides have a
strong eﬀect on future output. Other things equal, this implies long term contracts
are more likely to be used when, due to the characteristics of the crop, investment is
important for productivity, as is the case for trees as opposed to annual crops.6
Second, long term contracts can be used to smooth consumption and reduce the
risk borne by the agent when he has no access to credit.7 If risk aversion is decreasing
in wealth and poorer tenants are less likely to have access to credit, this implies long
5The principal and the agent can, in principle, agree to other output shares. In practice, however,
all sample contracts prescribe a 50-50 split.
6See Bardhan [1984], Banerjee et al [2002], Bose [1993] for specific applications to tenancy con-
tracts.
7Chiappori et al [1994] and Rogerson [1985] analyze the case of repeated moral hazard when
the agent has no access to credit markets. In this context the optimal long term contract generally
exhibits "memory", i.e. payments in each period are a function of past performance. Note that if
the agent has access to credit markets the outcome of a long term contract can be replicated by a
sequence of spot contracts and this rationale for long term commitment disappears. See Fudenberg
et al [1990] and Malcomson and Spinnewyn [1988].
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term contracts should be more likely to be oﬀered to poorer tenants.8
Third, long term contracts entail lower transaction costs because they have to be
agreed upon less frequently. An implication is that long term contracts should be
more common when the opportunity cost of time of the involved parties is high.
Long term contracts however entail a cost since commitment implies that the
principal forsakes eviction threats, which could otherwise be used to elicit eﬀort for
current production. The threat of eviction in case of failure is an eﬀective incentive
mechanism when the agent’s utility from the contract is higher than his reservation
utility. Since this is more likely to occur when the agent is poor or has a low outside
option, this implies poor tenants should be less likely to be oﬀered a long term
contract.9
Moreover, if the principal commits to a long term agreement, she gives up the
possibility to adjust the terms of the contract to suit changes in the environment.
In particular, the landlord gives up the option of cultivating the land directly for
the duration of the contract and the contract reduces the resale value of the land if
the buyer is bound to honor the existing tenancy agreement. The opportunity cost
in terms of loss of flexibility is higher for landowners who might want or need to
resume direct cultivation, implying that these should be more likely to oﬀer short
term contracts.
B. Contract Type: Fixed Rent vs Sharecropping.
Compared to share contracts, fixed rent contracts give the agent stronger incen-
tives to exert non observable eﬀort since under fixed rent he gets the full marginal
benefit of his eﬀort whereas under sharecropping he only gets a share.10Other things
equal, fixed rent contracts should therefore be chosen when the moral hazard problem
is more severe, for instance because the cultivated crop is very sensitive to eﬀort.
8See Bardhan [1983] and Fudenberg et al. [1990]. The latter also note that this prediction is
in contrast with evidence from firms, since, compared to workers, managers are more likely to be
oﬀered a long term contract.
9Note that eviction threats provide incentives for both current eﬀort and investment as the latter
increases output in the next period and hence the probability of retaining the job in the period after
next. See Banerjee et al [2002]; Banerjee and Ghatak [2003] and Dutta et al [1989]
10Singh [1989], Dutta et al [1989] and Otsuka et al. [1992] provide excellent surveys of the theo-
retical literature.
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In addition, if the contract is fixed rent the principal does not need to monitor the
division of output to make sure she is eﬀectively getting the contracted share. Fixed
rent contracts are therefore particularly well suited for landlords whose opportunity
cost of time is high.
Fixed rent contracts can however be suboptimal, from the principal’s point of
view, for the following reasons. First, under fixed rent the agent bears all production
risk. If the agent is risk averse, the principal might prefer sharecropping contracts as
these strike a compromise between incentives and insurance. Share contracts should
then be more common when the crop is risky and, if risk aversion decreases with
wealth, when the tenant is poor.11
Second, if the agent is subject to limited liability he might not be able to aﬀord
to pay rent in case of low output. The principal might then prefer to charge state
contingent payments, in other words, oﬀer a share contract.12 Since the limited
liability constraint is more likely to bind for poor tenants and tenants with low outside
option, these should be more likely to be hired under share contracts. Share contracts
should also be more likely when the spread between output in diﬀerent states of nature
is high.13
Finally, if production depends on both non observable eﬀort and non-observable
investment, share contracts might be preferred because fixed rent provide too much
incentive for eﬀort at the expense of investment. A similar argument can be made
if it is the case that the tenant can increase current production at the expense of
future production by overworking the land. This implies that share contracts should
11See Stiglitz [1974].
12See Shetty [1988], Dutta et al [1989], Mookherjee [1997], Banerjee et al [2002]. Basu [1992] and
Ghatak and Pandey [2000] also allow the tenant to choose the riskiness of the production technique.
They show that limited liability leads to an ineﬃcient outcome because it makes the tenant choose
techniques that are too risky. In this setting sharecropping contracts might be preferred because
they mitigate the incentive to choose risky projects. In the context analysed in this paper, how-
ever, considerations of this sort are not relevant as tenants have little discretion over production
techniques.
13To see this, assume there are only two states of nature, good and bad, and that output in the
bad state is zero. In the bad state, the maximum rent the tenant can pay is equal to his wealth
minus subsistence consumption. As the output in the good state increases the rent the landlord
wants to charge increases as well. For a given level of tenant’s wealth, the limited liability constraint
is therefore more likely to bind for crops that have a higher return spread. Banerjee et al [2002] and
Mookherjee [1997] provide a formal analysis.
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be observed when crop characteristics are such that multitasking issues are relevant
as in the case of trees compared to annual crops.14
C. Summary.
Table 1 presents a summary of the discussion above. The table lists the main
assumptions about the characteristics of the environment and their consequences for
the choice of contract duration and type. These are then mapped into observable
variables and implications are drawn. The variables and implications have been
selected keeping in mind the particular context of nineteenth century rural Sicily and
the available data, hence they do not constitute an exhaustive list.
The table highlights two important issues. First, diﬀerent assumptions lead to
similar implications for the eﬀect of one variable on one contractual dimension dif-
ferent on the other dimension. Information on both dimensions can then be used
to assess which considerations prevail. For instance, both limited liability and risk
sharing considerations imply that sharecropping contracts should be used for poor
tenants and risky crops. However, limited liability (with risk neutrality) implies that
poor tenants should be oﬀered short term contracts while risk sharing points to the
opposite. Which eﬀect prevails is ultimately an empirical question.
Second, data on both dimensions of contractual structure allow a better under-
standing of the evidence. For instance, multitasking considerations would suggest
that since fixed rent contracts provide too much incentive for production eﬀort at
the expense of investment eﬀort, sharecropping should be used for crops that are
more sensitive to investment eﬀort, namely trees. Contract length, however, can
be used to provide investment incentives directly, thus weakening this rationale for
sharecropping.
3 Data Description and Methodology
A. Data Description: Historical Context and Main Variables.
I use information on 705 tenancy contracts written in the district of Siracusa,
14See Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991], Allen and Lueck [1996], Ackerberg and Botticini [2000] and
Dubois [2002] for discussion and evidence on multitasking.
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Italy, between 1870 and 1880. Agriculture was the most important economic activity
at the time, employing the majority of the work force. Tenancy agreements were
common since land was unevenly distributed and rarely cultivated by the owners.15
Each contract is a legally binding agreement between a landlord, who owns the plot,
and a tenant who is hired to cultivate it. Contracts were written by a notary public,
following the instructions of the parties, and signed by these in his presence.16
The time period is chosen to match with an extensive descriptive literature on
Sicilian agriculture. In 1881 the Italian Parliament published a detailed survey on
the economic and social structure of the agricultural sector in diﬀerent regions of
the country [Inchiesta Iacini, 1881]. A similar survey was also carried out in 1911
[Inchiesta Parlamentare, 1911]. Both surveys describe Sicilian agriculture in great
detail and contain information that is relevant for the present work.
Compensation Scheme.
Each contract specifies the payment from the tenant to the landlord, which can
either be a share of the output, a fixed payment (either monetary or in kind) or a
combination of both. Most contracts (85% of the sample) are of the fixed rent type,
that is the tenant retains all the output and pays a fixed amount to the landlord at
the end of every year. The remaining 15% of contracts are of the sharecropping type
with share equal to one half.17 18
15In Sicily, feudalism was oﬃcially abrogated in 1812. Feudal fiefs were subsequently divided but
most landholdings remained quite large and in the hands of the aristocracy or rich burgeoise, who
typically rented out. Farmers who rented in were landless or owned small plots, insuﬃcient for
subsistence (Inchiesta Iacini [1881], Inchiesta Parlamentare [1911]).
16Compared to verbal agreements or contracts written privately by the two parties, contracts
written by notary publics had the status of “public” documents, which made them safer for both
parties. First, public contracts were binding for third parties implying that, for instance, if the
landlord were to sell the land the buyer had to honor the existing tenancy agreement. Also, in case
of sale, the tenant would give up the right to demand compensation. Finally, since most tenants
were illiterate, notary contracts make sure that the landlord eﬀectively wrote what was verbally
agreed upon. See Codice Civile per il Regno d’Italia (1865), no. 1597, 1601.
17The variation in contract type is much lower than what theory would predict but consistent with
observations from many other rural contexts. See Ackerberg and Botticini [2002], Dubois [2002],
Laﬀont and Matoussi [1995], Young and Burke [2001].
18The existing law ruled that, unless specified otherwise in the sharecropping contract, the tenant
was entitled to one half of the output. In addition, the tenant was supposed to provide draft
animals, tools, working capital and finance all “ordinary” cultivation expenditures. The landlord
was supposed to replace plants, if needed, and to finance “extraordinary expenditures”. Finally,
9
Interestingly, the fact that under sharecropping the tenant had the incentive to
cheat on the division of output was acknowledged by the judicial authorities at the
time. To protect the landlord from tenants’ opportunism, the law ruled that the
tenant could harvest the crop only after giving the landlord notice.19
Contract Duration.
Contracts make precise the duration of the agreement. Figure 1 shows that al-
though duration ranges from one to ten years, most contracts in the sample are either
1 or 4 years long. The fact that the unit of measure of duration is years as opposed
to, say, months or days, is due to the fact that all crops in the sample give yearly
yields. The concentration on two values (one and four) is more surprising. This might
be due to the same reasons that limit the variation of the output share and is also
consistent with evidence from other studies of contract duration.20
Figure 1: Contract Duration
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Given the distribution of the duration variable and for ease of exposition, the
analysis focuses on the distinction between short and long term contracts. The former
the landlord and the tenant each had to provide half of the seeds. See Codice Civile per il Regno
d’Italia (1865) no.1654, 1655, 1656, 1657, 1658, 1661. See also Pacifici-Mazzoni and Venzi (1921) p.
343, 352, 353, 355, 356, 365, 366.
19Codice Civile per il Regno d’Italia (1865) no.1660. See also Pacifici-Mazzoni and Venzi (1921)
p. 367.
20For instance, Brickley et al [2003] find that most franchise contracts are 5 or 10 years long.
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includes one year contracts that give the tenant no stake in future production; the
latter includes contracts that are longer than one year and therefore provide some
incentives for non observable investment eﬀort. As shown in section 5, using all
information on duration does not oﬀer additional insights.
It is important to note that the length variable measures the duration of the
contract, which does not necessarily coincide with the duration of the relationship
between the landlord and the tenant. This could indeed be much longer if the same
parties were to renew the agreement every time it expires.
It is then key to assess whether the duration of the contract eﬀectively conveys
information on investment incentives, or whether, because of frequent renewals, short
term contracts are practically equivalent to long term contracts.
If the tenant expects to leave the plot at the end of the year with positive prob-
ability, a sequence of short term contracts is not equivalent to a long term contract
with regards to investment incentives because a positive probability of non-renewal
is eﬀectively a tax on the return of the tenant’s investment eﬀort.
In this context there are two reasons to believe that the ex-ante probability of
non-renewal is indeed positive. First, the wording of the contracts makes clear that
the tenant is required to leave the land at the end of the lease.21 Second, since
signing new contracts is costly both in terms of time and because the notary public
charges a fixed fee for his services, the ex-ante probability of non-renewal must be
positive, otherwise parties could save on renegotiation costs by signing a long term
agreement.22
21By law, each contract terminates by law on the last day of agreed lease period. If the duration
is not specified the contract is intended to be expire after the first harvest. For both sharecropping
and fixed rent contracts, if the tenant remains on the plot with the consent of the landlord the
contract is extended until the next harvest but it loses the status of public document unless it is
formally renewed in the presence of a notary public. See Codice Civile per il Regno d’Italia (1865),
no. 1591, 1593, 1622, 1623, 1624, 1651. See also Pacifici-Mazzoni and Venzi (1921), p.202-207,
273-275, 375-377.
22In addition, rent reduction rules made long term contracts more convenient for the landlord.
The law indeed prescribes that if, due to circumstances beyond the tenant’s control, more than half
of the harvest got destroyed, the tenant has the right to demand rent reduction in proportion to the
loss if the contract is one year long. If the contract is long term, however, the tenant loses the right
to demand rent reduction if the loss in one year is compensated by rich harvests either in past or in
future years. See Codice Civile per il Regno d’Italia (1865), no. 1617, 1618; Pacifici-Mazzoni and
Venzi (1921), p. 256-272.
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It is important to note that the ex-ante probability of non-renewal can be posi-
tive even if the same landlord-tenant pair sign a short term contract year after year.
Indeed, when eviction threats are used as an incentive mechanism, the ex-post proba-
bility of renewal is high precisely because the ex-ante threat of non-renewal provides
eﬀort incentives leading to high productivity. As argued in section two, giving up
eviction threats is part of what makes long term contracts costly.
In addition to the information on the terms of the agreement, each document
also contains information on the type of crop, on the wealth of the tenant and on
landlord’s characteristics. The remainder of this section describes these in detail.
Crop Type.
Crops in the sample are cereals, olive, vines, citrus and fruit trees.23 With a few
exceptions, each contract regulates the cultivation of one crop only. In most cases
where annual and tree crops are grown in the same plot, as is sometimes the case with
wheat and olive, trees are excluded from the agreement.24 The typical contract also
contains clauses to forbid tenants to change crops or to plant other crops in addition
to the existing ones.
Detailed information on crop characteristics can be found in Inchiesta Iacini [1881]
and Inchiesta Parlamentare [1911]. According to these, tree crops were much more
sensitive to non observable investment eﬀort than the annual crops in the sample,
which is consistent with intuition and with evidence from other times and places.25
Fertilizers and/or manure were seldom employed in wheat and barley fields. In-
stead, the land would be left fallow every three or five years to restore fertility. Fallow
land is obviously observable and hence contractible, suggesting that only a few non
observable investment tasks (e.g. deep ploughing and weeding) were left to the dis-
23Cereals are wheat and barley, whose cultivation techniques were very similar. Eighty-two percent
of cereals contracts are for wheat. Fruit trees include many varieties such as cherries, pears, peaches,
apricots and almonds.
24This was possible because trees were generally grown on one side of the plot, which the tenant
was asked to ignore. Contracts typically contain a detailed description of the location and number
of trees to prevent the tenant from cutting them to sell the wood.
25Ackerberg and Botticini [2000 and 2002] argue that vines were more sensitive to investment
eﬀort than cereals in Renaissance Tuscany. Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991] make a similar point
about vines in contemporary California.
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cretion of the tenant. Non observable investment eﬀort was much more important
for vines and citrus trees, which were very sensitive to the timing and dosage of
fertilizers and pesticides. Both crops needed regular hoeing (4/5 times a year) and
pruning,26 citrus trees were also very sensitive to irrigation timing. Olive trees also
needed regular pruning, careful harvesting, tilling and fertilizing but were apparently
more resistant than either vines or citrus.27
While it is diﬃcult to measure riskiness and spread of each crop precisely, the
qualitative evidence indicates a clear ranking. Vines and citrus trees were the riskier
crops, olive trees were somewhat less risky and cereals the safest. The ranking in
terms of spread between the good and the failure state is similar, namely vines and
citrus had the highest. For instance, Inchiesta Iacini [1881] reports that net revenues
per hectare under “normal condition”, that is in the success state, ranged between
L.50 and L.150 for wheat, between L.300 and L.800 for vines and between L.500 and
L.1300 for citrus trees.28
In the empirical analysis I group crops in two ways. The most conservative choice,
used for the main specification, exploits the natural diﬀerence in life span as a measure
of investment sensitivity, thus I group all tree crops together and compare them to
annual crops. Alternatively I use the available evidence on the diﬀerence between
vines and citrus on the one hand and olives and fruit on the other to form three
crop groups: annual (cereals), low-maintenance/low-risk trees (olive and fruit) and
high-maintenance/high-risk trees (vines and citrus).
Table 2B shows the frequency of the diﬀerent type of contracts by crop type.
Contractual structure clearly varies by crop: 89% of annual crop fields are cultivated
under fixed rent, with a predominance of short (53%) over long term (36%) contracts.
Sharecropping is much more likely for tree crops, especially for vines and citrus. The
26To avoid excess pruning motivated by the resale value of the wood, contracts typically established
that the pruned woods belonged to the landlord. In some cases pruning was performed by other
workers under the direct supervision of the landlord.
27Olive yields were particularly sensitive to the harvesting method employed the year before. The
quickest system, “abbacchiatura”, consisted in shaking the tree until all the olives fell. This system
had the serious drawback of destroying many of the buds, thereby reducing the following year’s
production. See Inchiesta Iacini [1881].
28No information on net revenue of either olive or other fruit trees is reported, possibly because
these were generally grown for personal consumption rather than commercialization.
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diﬀerence in contract length between annual and tree crops is striking: while about
60% of the contracts for annual crops are one year long, the percentage falls to 8%
for all tree crops and only 3% for vines and citrus.29
Tenants’ Wealth.
In nineteen century rural Sicily, formal credit markets were seriously underdevel-
oped and accessible only to wealthy landowners since lenders required strong guar-
antees. Poor farmers relied on informal lenders and on their landlords for working
capital loans. The fact that credit and insurance markets were highly imperfect is
especially important because it suggests that risk sharing and limited liability issues,
both of which make incentive provision costly, are relevant in this context.
Each contract in the sample specifies the social class of the tenant after mentioning
his name. Social class can be reasonably used to proxy wealth and both the Inchiesta
Iacini [1881] and the Inchiesta Parlamentare [1911] report a clear ranking of rural
social classes according to the wealth of their members.
Tenants in the sample belong to one of three social classes. The lowest class was
made of villici, poor farmers who owned “only the strength in their arms” [Inchiesta
Iacini 1881]; the second lowest were contadini or coloni, farmers who owned a mule
and/or a small house and possibly a small plot of land by the house; the wealthiest
class were possidenti, that is tenants who owned land of their own.30 I refer to tenants
in the three classes as poor, middle class and rich respectively. The sample shares
are 34%, 40% and 26%.
Table 2C shows the frequency of the diﬀerent type of contracts by tenant class.
The table reveals that the frequency of long term-fixed rent contracts increases
steadily with wealth while the frequency of short term-fixed rent contracts declines
dramatically as wealth increases. Also, sharecropping contracts are twice as likely for
poor, compared to rich, tenants.
29Average duration is 2.3 for cereals, 3.85 for olives and fruit trees, 4.15 for vines and citrus trees.
30A small number of tenants (5% of the sample) belonged to the class of massari, that is wealthy
farmers who owned draft animals, a house and some plots of land. For simplicity, these have been
grouped with the wealthiest class of possidenti. Moreover, industriosi, i.e. artisans, whose wealth,
according to Damiani (1881), was comparable to contadini0s have been included in that group.
Results are robust to alternative definitions.
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Social class improves over existing wealth measures because it can be taken to be
exogenous to the extent that social mobility is low. Such was the case in 19th century
Sicily, where, according to Inchiesta Iacini [1881] and Inchiesta Parlamentare [1911],
social class was generally determined at birth. However, since social class is quite
coarsely defined, the estimate of the wealth eﬀect might be biased downward.
Limited liability models predict that contract choice depends on the tenant’s out-
side option, in addition to her/his wealth. Contracts do not contain this type of
information but Inchiesta Iacini [1881] reports data on the daily wage for rural work-
ers in diﬀerent towns. I use this as a proxy for the tenants’ outside option. The
average wage was L.1.38 with a standard deviation of .27.31
Landlord’s Characteristics.
Contracts contain information on the gender of the landlord, on whether her legal
residence was in the same town where the plot was located, and on whether she
belonged to the aristocracy. These variables proxy for the landlord’s participation in
the agricultural business and hence for monitoring, transaction and flexibility costs.
Due to social norms, female landlords were not likely to be directly involved in
cultivation and, due to the fact that they had to travel from a diﬀerent town, landlords
who resided away from the plot were also less likely to participate to agricultural
decisions. Landlords who belonged to the aristocracy were also less likely to be
directly involved in agriculture. Female, absentee and aristocratic landlords faced a
higher opportunity cost of time and higher monitoring and renegotiation costs. To the
extent that they were less likely to either need or want to resume direct cultivation,
these landlords were also likely to value flexibility less.
Table 2D shows the frequency of the diﬀerent type of contracts by landlord’s char-
acteristics. Aristocratic and female landlords were clearly diﬀerent from the average
landlord in the sample as they were much more likely to oﬀer long term/fixed rent
contracts (88% vs 62% in the overall sample). Landlords whose legal residence was
in a diﬀerent town also seem very diﬀerent from the average as they are, surprisingly,
more likely to oﬀer short term contracts.
31Italian Liras ca 1881.
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Note that “legal residence” identifies the town where the landlord is registered
with the records’ oﬃce rather than the town she lived in. Although most of the
times these should coincide, landlords would not change their records if they moved
temporarily to another town. To the extent that this happened, “legal residence” is
a noisy measure of actual residence.
B. Methodology.
The analysis focuses on the determinants of the choice between long term and
short term contracts and between fixed rent and sharecropping contracts. To begin
with, contracts are classified as long term (short term) if they last more (less) than 1
year. The classification is motivated by the consideration that, in contrast to longer
contracts, one year contracts give the tenant no stake in future production. In section
5, I extend the framework to allow contract duration to take multiple values.
The landlord chooses the length of the contract and the compensation scheme
to maximize her payoﬀ for given tenant’s and crop’s characteristics.32 As discussed
above, under fixed rent contracts the tenant’s output share is equal to one while under
sharecropping contracts the share is one half. The two first order conditions of the
landlord’s maximization problem yield the optimal length (l∗) and output share (f∗)
as a function of each other and of the exogenous variables. Assuming linearity, the
model is;
½
l∗ = αlf
∗ +X 0βl + l
f∗ = αf l
∗ +X 0βf + f
(1)
where X 0 is the vector of observable tenant, landlord and crop characteristics
while l, f capture the eﬀect of variables that aﬀect the landlord’s choice but are not
observed by the econometrician. Variables in X include the tenant’s social class, the
landlord’s gender, social class and town of residence and the type of crop cultivated
32In line with most literature, the landlord is assumed to have all the bargaining power and match-
ing between landlords and tenants is assumed to be random. The first assumption is appropriate
given the abundance of labor relative to land in the context under study. Random matching is
discussed in section 5, below.
16
on the rented plot. Variables in l, f include for instance soil quality and the tenant’s
degree of risk aversion.
The data does not contain information on l∗ and f∗. Instead, we observe two
discrete variables l and f ; where l equals one when the contract is long term and
zero otherwise and f equals one when the contract is fixed rent and zero otherwise.
If l∗ and f∗ are global maxima, the landlord will choose a long term contract if the
optimal length is above a threshold l¯ and similarly choose a fixed rent contract if the
optimal share is above a given threshold f¯ . The decision rule then is;
½
l = 1 if l∗ > l¯
l = 0 if l∗ ≤ l¯ and
½
f = 1 if f ∗ > f¯
f = 0 if f∗ ≤ f¯ (2)
The discussion in section 2 makes clear that none of variables in X can be reason-
ably excluded from either the length or the type equation in (1). In addition, neither
contract law nor other exogenous factors that could aﬀect contractual structure ex-
hibit geographical or time variation in the sample. Following standard practice in the
empirical contract literature,33 I therefore estimate the reduced form of (1) ;
½
l∗ = γl +X
0πl + νl, l = 1 if l∗ > 0, l = 0 otherwise
f∗ = γf +X
0πf + νf , f = 1 if f∗ > 0, f = 0 otherwise
(3)
Where γl, γf are constants, X is the vector of tenant, landlord and production
function characteristics. To take into account that some unobserved determinants
might be common to both equations in (2), I assume that the disturbances νl and
νf are jointly normally distributed with E[νl] = E[νf ] = 0, V ar[νl] = V ar[νf ] = 1,
Cov[νl, νf ] = ρ and estimate the system by bivariate probit.
In terms of the structural form parameters, the coeﬃcient on variable k in equation
i is equal to πki =
βki+αiβkj
1−αiaj for i, j = l, t . This implies that if αi 6= 0 the reduced form
coeﬃcients πi capture both the direct eﬀect of each variable on each dimension (βi)
and the indirect eﬀect through the other dimension (βj).
The structural coeﬃcient of variable k in equation i in (1) is then equal to βki =
πki − αiπkj , which implies that if the indirect eﬀects are not too large, namely |αi| ≤¯¯¯
πki
πkj
¯¯¯
, the structural coeﬃcient will have the same sign as its reduced form counterpart.
33See the numerous studies reviewed in Chiappori and Salanie [2003].
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In addition to the coeﬃcients vectors (πl, πt), I evaluate the marginal eﬀect of each
right hand side variable on the marginal probability of observing a long term contract
Pr(l = 1), on the marginal probability of observing a fixed rent contract Pr(f = 1)
and on the joint probabilities of the four possible length and type combinations.
The marginal eﬀect on the marginal probabilitites measures the eﬀect of one ex-
ogenous variable on one contractual dimension at the time. Given that exogenous
variables are discrete the marginal eﬀect is measured as the discrete change in proba-
bility when the exogenous variable goes from 0 to 1. For instance, the marginal eﬀect
of xk on the probability of observing a long term contract is
γkl=1 = Pr(l = 1|xk = 1)− Pr(l = 1|xk = 0)
Probabilitites are computed using the cumulative normal distribution evaluated
at xk = 1 or xk = 0 and at the mean of the other right hand side variables.
The second type of marginal eﬀects measures the eﬀect of one exogenous variable
on both dimensions at the same time, namely on the joint probability of observing a
given combination of length and type. For instance, the marginal eﬀect of xk on the
joint probability of observing a long term (l = 1) and fixed rent (f = 1) contract is
γkl=1,f=1 = Pr(l = 1, f = 1|xk = 1)− Pr(l = 1, f = 1|xk = 0).
where probabilities are computed using the bivariate cumulative normal distribution,
evaluated at xk = 1 or xk = 0 and at the mean of the other right hand side variables.
Note that the marginal eﬀect of xk on one marginal probability, for instance the
probability of observing a long term contract, is a combination of its marginal eﬀects
on the joint probability of observing a long-fixed contract and on the joint probability
of observing a long-share contract. In particular, when xk is discrete, the marginal
eﬀects on the joint probability and the marginal eﬀect on the marginal probabilities
are linked as follows;
γkf=z = γ
k
l=1,f=z + γ
k
l=0,f=z and γ
k
l=v = γ
k
l=v,f=1 + γ
k
l=v,f=0
where v and z can be either 0 or 1. The marginal eﬀect of xk on the probability
of observing f = z is thus the sum of the marginal eﬀect on the joint probability
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of observing f = z and l = 1 and the marginal eﬀect on the joint probability of
observing f = z and l = 0.34Analyzing the marginal eﬀects on the joint probabilities
is of interest because it allows to identify cases in which the marginal eﬀect of xk on
one contractual dimension is zero because the variable’s eﬀect on the other dimension
cancels it out.
Finally, the estimation rests on the assumption that the right hand side variables
are not correlated with the error term. First, crop choice is assumed to be exogenous
to contract type. Although both are variables of choice for the landowner, the as-
sumption is supported by the fact that the life span of the sample trees is much longer
than the typical contract duration. Vines and citrus trees have a productive life of
at least thirty years, while olive trees can last over one hundred years. Contracts in
the sample are typically one or four years long. In this sense it is safe to assume that
the landlord chose the contract to fit the crop rather than vice versa.35
Second, it is assumed that the type of contract does not aﬀect the social class
of the tenant, which is supported by the fact that social mobility at the time was
extremely low. Wealth estimates might however be biased if tenants and crops are
endogenously matched; I address this issue in Section 5.
Third, it is assumed that contract type does not determine the landlord’s charac-
teristics either. Of these two are clearly predetermined (gender and aristocracy) and
34This can be shown using the link between joint and conditional probabilities. Given that
Pr(l = v, f = z) = (Pr(l = v|f = z)) ∗ Pr(f = z)
the marginal eﬀect of xkon Pr(l = 1, f = z) is equal to:
γkl=1,f=z = [Pr(l = 1|f = z, xk = 1) ∗Pr(f = z|xk = 1)−Pr(l = 1|f = z, xk = 0) ∗Pr(f = z|xk = 0)]
while the marginal eﬀect of xkon Pr(l = 0, f = z) is equal to:
γkl=0,f=z = [Pr(l = 0|f = z, xk = 1) ∗Pr(f = z|xk = 1)−Pr(l = 0|f = z, xk = 0) ∗Pr(f = z|xk = 0)]
Therefore,
γkl=1,f=z + γ
k
l=0,f=z = Pr(f = z|xk = 1)− Pr(f = z|xk = 0) = γkf=z
35Endogeneity is a much more serious concern when all crops are annual, and can therefore be
chosen at the same time as the contract (Dubois 2002).
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legal residence would only be aﬀected if crop choice would cause the landlord to move
indefinitely to another town. Even if the landlord’s characteristics are predetermined,
sample selection and measurement problem could still create a spurious link between
contract type and the other independent variables. Section 5 discusses these issues
in detail.
4 Empirical Analysis: Main Findings.
A. Basic Specification
Table 3 reports the estimates of model (2). Columns type (a) estimate the proba-
bility of observing a long term contract, columns type (b) estimate the probability of
observing a fixed rent contract. Each pair of equations is estimated simultaneously
as explained above.
For each of the independent variables, Table 3 reports the reduced form coeﬃcients
πl, πf , their standard errors and the marginal eﬀects on the marginal probabilities of
observing a long term and a fixed rent contract respectively.
Columns 1a and 1b analyze the eﬀect of crop type, columns 2a and 2b add infor-
mation on the tenant’s social class, while columns 3a and 3b also include landlords’
characteristics. Point estimates and significance levels do not change in the three
specifications, suggesting low correlation among the right hand side variables.
Contracts were signed in eleven diﬀerent towns (all in the district of Siracusa)
and ten diﬀerent years (1870-1880).36 The eﬀect of the variables of interest is thus
identified from the variation both within and across towns. To the extent that town
and year specific unobservables aﬀect both contractual structure and the right hand
side variables, the coeﬃcients might be biased. Columns 4a and 4b include town
and year dummies to address this concern. The results are qualitatively similar to
those in columns 3a and 3b but, not surprisingly given sample size, coeﬃcients are
smaller and the estimated marginal eﬀects are between one half and one quarter of
their previous values. Further results, not reported for reasons of space, show that
changes are mostly due to the inclusion of the town dummies while including year
36The eleven towns are: Augusta, Buccheri, Buscemi, Carlentini, Ferla, Francofonte, Lentini,
Noto, Pachino, Rosolini and Siracusa.
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controls is of little consequence. Both town and year dummies are jointly significant
in both equations. In what follows, I take the most conservative strategy and include
town and year controls throughout. The eﬀect of the variables of interested is thus
identified from the variation within town and year.
Crop Type.
The coeﬃcients on crop type indicate that trees make long term contracts more
likely but have no eﬀect on contract type.
Column 3a shows that tree cultivation increases the probability of observing a
long term contract by .40, that is more than half of the sample mean (.74). When
the estimate relies exclusively on within town and year variation (column 4a), the
marginal eﬀect is .14.
Columns 3b and 4b show that when town and year eﬀects are not controlled for,
there is some evidence that trees reduce the probability of observing a fixed rent
contract (by .06, significant at the 10% level) however this eﬀect loses significance
when towns and years eﬀects are included.
Tenant Wealth
Columns 3a and 4a, table 3, show that when the tenant belongs to the lowest
social class the probability of observing a long term contract falls by .3 when town
and year eﬀects are not controlled for and by .07 when they are. The estimated
marginal eﬀect is between 40% and 10% of sample mean. When the tenant belongs
to the middle class, the probability of observing a long term contract falls by .22 in
column 3a but the eﬀect loses significance when I control for town and year eﬀects
(column 4a).
Results in column 3b and 4b indicate that the tenant’s social class is the most
important determinant of contract type. The probability of observing a fixed rent
contract falls by .15 if the tenant belongs to the lowest, compared to richest, class
and by .08 if he belongs to the middle class. With town and year controls, column
4b, the estimated marginal eﬀects are .08 and .05 respectively.
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Landlord Characteristics
The probability of observing a long term contract is higher when the landlord is
female or belongs to the aristocracy. The magnitude of these eﬀects is similar (.17
vs .16 in column 3a and .05 vs .06 in column 4a) while the coeﬃcient of landlord’s
residence is not precisely estimated.37
Columns 3b and 4b reveal a similar pattern for contract type. The probability of
observing a fixed rent contract is higher when the landlord is female or belongs to
the aristocracy and the eﬀects are similar in size (.09 vs .08 in column 3b and .03 in
column 4b) while landlord’s residence has a positive and significant eﬀect only when
town and year eﬀects are not controlled for.
Summary and Interpretation
The theories reviewed in section 2 yield three unambiguous predictions on the
sign of the coeﬃcients of the structural model (βl, βf) :
(1) βtreel ≥ 0; that is long term contracts should be more likely for trees as these
are more sensitive to investment;
(2) βpoorf ≤ βmiddlef ≤ 0; the probability of observing a fixed rent contract should
be decreasing in tenants’ wealth, either because of risk sharing or limited liability ;
(3) βabsenteei ≥ 0, β
female
i ≥ 0, βaristocrati ≥ 0 for i = l, f ; that is, landlords who are
less likely to be directly involved in cultivation should be more likely to oﬀer long
term fixed rent contracts to minimize transaction and monitoring costs.
Predictions on the other parameters, for instance the eﬀect of tenants’ wealth on
contract length, are ambiguous as diﬀerent eﬀects pull in diﬀerent directions.
The structural coeﬃcients are a combination of the reduced form coeﬃcients esti-
mated in table 3. In particular, βki = π
k
i −αiπkj , which implies to the extent that the
direct eﬀect of variable k on contractual dimension i is larger than its indirect eﬀect
through the other dimension, the sign of the structural coeﬃcients are the same as
the sign of the reduced form coeﬃcients reported in table 3.
37The coeﬃcient is negative when cross-town and cross-year variation is not controlled for and
zero when it is. Below, I find that this eﬀect is not very robust and that it mostly derives from
the fact that these landlords are less likely to oﬀer long term share contracts rather than long term
per se. As discussed above, measurement error in this variable is likely to be high because “legal
residence” does not necessarily coincide with the town the landlord lives in.
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In terms of the parameter of the model this requires |αi| ≤
¯¯¯
πki
πkj
¯¯¯
, that is the
eﬀect of contract length on contract type and vice-versa should not be too large. If
this condition is satisfied, the results in table 3 are consistent with the theoretical
predictions. For instance, the estimated coeﬃcients of tree in columns (4a) and (4b)
indicate that as long as αl > −22.15, βtreel ≥ 0 namely, long term contracts are more
likely when the marginal benefit of investment is highest. Similarly, the estimates
suggest that if αt ≤ 1.45 poor tenants are less likely to get fixed rent contracts in line
with both the risk sharing and the limited liability models. Finally, landlords who
face higher transaction and monitoring costs are more likely to oﬀer long term and
fixed rent contracts.
Table 3 also reports the estimated correlation coeﬃcient between the disturbance
terms of the contract length and contract type equations. The estimate is posi-
tive (.08) indicating that omitted factors push for high powered incentives in both
contractual dimensions but the Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero
correlation. Since the correlation coeﬃcient between the disturbance terms in the
reduced form equations measures the correlation of the observed outcomes after con-
trolling for exogenous variables, this finding does not contradict the idea that the
choices over the two contractual dimensions are correlated in the underlying model.38
B. Marginal Eﬀects on the Joint Probabilities.
Table 4 reports the marginal eﬀects on the joint probabilities of the four combina-
tions, namely long term-fixed rent, long term-share, short term-fixed rent and short
term-share. For ease of comparison the table also reports the marginal eﬀects on the
marginal probabilities from columns (4a) and (4b) in table 3 above.
Three findings are noteworthy. First, the eﬀect of tenants’ wealth on the probabil-
ity of observing a long term contract depends on whether the contract is fixed rent or
sharecropping. Column (1) indicates that, compared to rich tenants, poor and middle
class tenants are significantly less likely to be oﬀered a long term/fixed rent contract
38Note that since νi =
i+αij
1−αiαj , where i are the disturbances of the structural equations,
Cov(νl, νf ) =
1
(1− αlαf )2
[αfV ar(l) + αlV ar(f ) + (1 + αlαf )Cov(l, f )]
that is Cov(νl, νf ) = 0 does not imply Cov(l, f ) = 0.
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(by .14 and .07). Column (2) shows that, at the same time, poor and middle class
tenants are significantly more likely to be oﬀered a long term/share contract (by .07
and .05). For poor tenants the first eﬀect dominates, making long term contracts less
likely to be observed when the tenant belongs to the lowest social class. For middle
class tenants the two eﬀects cancel out, so that the variable has no significant eﬀect
on the overall probability of observing a long term contract.
Second, the eﬀect of trees on the probability of observing a fixed rent contract
depends on whether this is long or short term. Column (1) suggests that, compared
to annual crops, trees significantly increase the probability of a long term fixed rent
contract (by .13) while column (3) shows that trees significantly decrease the proba-
bility of a short term fixed rent contract (by .14). The two eﬀects cancel out and, as
seen in column 6, trees do not significantly aﬀect the overall probability of observing
a fixed rent contract.
Third, female and aristocratic landlords are significantly more likely to oﬀer long
term fixed rent contracts and significantly less likely to oﬀer any of the other three
combinations. Landlords whose legal residence is in a diﬀerent town are less likely to
oﬀer long term share contracts.
Interestingly, the table shows that using information on one dimension only can
mislead the interpretation of the evidence if, as is sometimes the case here, the eﬀect
of one variable on one contractual dimension is nil because the variable’s eﬀect on
the other dimension cancels it out.
Overall the results suggest that crop type primarily drives the choice between
long and short term while tenant’s wealth appears to be the main determinant of
the choice between fixed rent and share. Landlords who face higher monitoring and
renegotiation costs choose long term coupled with fixed rent.
C. Interactions.
Table 5 augments the model by allowing the eﬀect of tenant class to depend on
crop type and vice-versa. Three findings emerge.
First, the fact that the coeﬃcient of poor is negative and significant in column
(1a) indicates that rich and middle class tenants are more likely to get long term
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contracts regardless of crop type.
Second, the fact that, in column (1a), the interaction term poor ∗ tree is positive,
significant and equal in magnitude but opposite in sign to the poor variable, indicates
that when they cultivate trees poor tenants are as likely as other tenants to be oﬀered
a long term contract. In other words, poor tenants are more likely to get long term
contracts only if they cultivate trees.
Finally, the fact that poor andmiddle class by themselves do not have a significant
eﬀect on contract type (column 1b) while they are negative and significant when
interacted with tree suggests that tenants belonging to the two lower classes are as
likely as rich tenants to get a fixed rent contract when they cultivate annual crops,
whereas they are significantly more likely to get a share contract when they cultivate
trees. This finding also speaks to the relationship between crop type and contract
type. Trees are indeed, and as expected, more likely to be cultivated under share
agreements but only if the tenant is not rich.
Overall the balance of evidence indicates that investment incentives (via long
term contracts) are always provided for tree crops but not for annual crops and
poor tenants. High powered incentives for both investment and eﬀort are always
oﬀered when the tenant is rich, and when the landlord faces high monitoring and
renegotiation costs.
To the extent that the structural coeﬃcients have the same sign as their reduced
form counterpart, the findings suggest that risk sharing considerations do not prevail
in the choice of contract length. Poor tenants, who would need insurance against
unemployment risk and income fluctuations the most, are actually less likely to be
oﬀered a long term contract.
Finally, that share contracts are more likely to be chosen for trees but only when
the tenant is poor suggests that, in this context, multitasking considerations do not
play a major role in determining the choice between fixed rent and share contracts.
If they did, we would expect trees to be cultivated under share contracts regardless
of the wealth of the tenant.
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5 Empirical Analysis: Extensions.
Alternative Definition of Contract Length.
The analysis of contract length as a dichotomous variable highlighted the diﬀer-
ence between one-year contracts that give the tenant no stake in future production,
and longer contracts that, instead, make the tenant’s pay conditional on future per-
formance.
Since sample contracts are between one and ten years long, the data also allows
to analyze the choice among all the diﬀerent duration outcomes. The exercise is of
interest in itself and because it allows to establish whether the results of the previous
section are due to the particular classification of length employed there.
To capture the fact that the choice of length is discrete, I estimate the following
model;
½
d∗ = X 0πd + νd, d = j if kj−1 < d∗ < kj, j = 1..10 k0 = −∞; k10 =∞
f∗ = X 0πf + νf , f = 1 if f∗ > 0, 0 otherwise
(4)
As in the previous section, I assume that the disturbances νd and νf are jointly nor-
mally distributed with E[νd] = E[νf ] = 0, V ar[νd] = V ar[νf ] = 1 and Cov[νd, νf ] =
η to take into account that some unobserved determinants might be common to both
equations. I then estimate the two equations in (4) jointly by full information maxi-
mum likelihood.
Table 6 presents the findings for both the basic specification and the model with
interactions. Columns 1a and 2a report findings on duration, columns 1b and 2b on
type. The corresponding results for the dichotomous lenght variable were presented
in tables 3 and 5.
The estimated coeﬃcients in the duration equations suggest that, in line with the
previous findings, one year contracts are less likely to be used for trees, by landlords
who do not belong to the aristocracy and for rich tenants. In contrast to previous
findings, however, the landlord’s gender is not a significant determinant of contract
length.
To illustrate the eﬀect of the exogenous variables on the choice of duration between
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one and ten, Table 7 reports the marginal eﬀect of each variable on the probability of
observing each of the ten outcomes. Since all right hand side variables are discrete,
the marginal eﬀect of xk on the probability of d = r, for r = 1...10 is;
γkd=r = Pr(d = r|xk = 1)− Pr(d = r|xk = 0)
Three findings are noteworthy.
First, the comparison of these results to the ones for the dicothomous length
variable used in tables 3 and 5 reveals that the estimates are identical in sign and
very close in magnitude. To be precise, the marginal eﬀects on the probability of
observing a one year contract in table 7, are equivalent to the marginal eﬀects on the
probability of observing a short term contract when the length variable is dichotomous
as in tables 3 and 5. Using all information on contract length does not therefore alter
the previous findings.
Second, the marginal eﬀects are by far larger for two most common outcomes,
namely one and four years, compared to all the other alternatives, suggesting that the
previous results on the choice between short and long term contracts were eﬀectively
driven by the comparison between one and four year long contracts.
Third, table 7 shows that the marginal eﬀects on the probability of observing
a one, two or three year long contract have the same sign and that the sign of the
marginal eﬀects switches for the probabilities of observing all durations larger or equal
to four. For instance, tree cultivation increases the probability of observing contracts
that are longer than three years and decreases the probability of observing contracts
that are three years or shorter.
A plausible reason is that wheat was often cultivated in a two or three year rotation
with fallow and legumes and the plot was rented out for the entire duration of the
cycle. On a three year rotation, plots were divided into three parts and in each year
a diﬀerent part would be cultivated with wheat, one with legumes and the third left
fallow. A three year contract would then be needed to complete the cycle on the plot.
The two year rotation was similar but no part was left fallow.39
39Under the latter system the whole plot would generally be left fallow after two cycles, i.e. every
fifth year.
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In these cases it would take, respectively, three or two years for wheat to be
harvested throughout the plot so that a three or two year contract would be eﬀectively
be "short term" by the definition above. Richer data would be needed to explore this
issue further. For the purpose of this paper, it is reassuring to note that the marginal
eﬀects on the probabilities of observing a two or three year long contract are very
small, so that the estimates of the dichotomous length variable are the same regardless
of whether two and three year contracts are classified as long or as short term.
Finally, table 6 shows that allowing contract length to take ten values does not
aﬀect the findings on the determinants of contract type. The comparison of columns
1b and 2b (Table 6) to columns 4b (Table 3) and 1b (Table 5) reveals that the
magnitude of the coeﬃcients in the contract type equation is identical.
Alternative Definitions of Crop Type
As discussed in section 3, while their longer life span makes trees naturally more
sensitive to investment than annual crops, trees do not constitute an homogeneous
group. Agronomic evidence suggest that vines and citrus trees might be more sensitive
both to production and investment eﬀort than olives and fruit trees. In addition, vines
and citrus trees are likely to be riskier and have a larger spread between good and bad
state outcomes. Columns 1a and 1b, table 8, exploit this information and estimates
model (1) keeping olives and fruit trees separate from vines and citrus trees.
Results in column 1a indicate that both types of trees increase the probability of
observing a long term contract but the marginal eﬀect of vines and citrus trees is about
three times larger than the eﬀect of olive and fruit trees (.13 compared to .04). The
diﬀerence is statistically significant and consistent with vines and citrus trees being
more sensitive to non observable investment. Column 1b shows that while vines and
citrus trees decrease the probability of a fixed rent contract (and hence increase the
probability of a share contract), olive and fruit trees increase it. However, neither
eﬀect is significant at conventional levels. Further analysis, not reported for reasons of
space, reveals that, as with the previous definition of trees, share contracts are more
likely to be observed when vines or citrus are cultivated and the tenant belongs to
the two lowest classes. Finally, the comparison with the basic specification reported
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in table 3, reveals that the estimated eﬀects of all other variables are unchanged.
Although trees are often found in wheat fields, they are generally excluded from
the contract. Only 15% of sample contracts for wheat also required the tenant to
tend to trees as a secondary crop.40 In columns 2a and 2b, table 8, the tree variable
equals one both when trees are the primary crop and when they are a secondary
crop in a wheat field. Coeﬃcient estimates are generally unchanged except that
the marginal eﬀect of crop type on contract length doubles (.26 vs .13), which sug-
gests that neglecting the information on secondary crops biases the coeﬃcient of tree
downwards.41
Tenants’ Outside Opportunity.
If the tenant is subject to limited liability, the structure of the optimal contract
depends on his outside option in addition to his wealth. In particular, fixed rent
contracts should be more likely when the tenant’s outside option is high. Columns
3a and 3b, table 8, include the daily wage for adult male rural workers in the local
labor market as a proxy for the tenant’s outside option. Data on wages are collected
from interviews with the towns’ mayors and reported in Inchiesta Iacini [1881] for
each town.
To the extent that farmers are unwillingly or unable to move between towns
the wage captures the diﬀerences in the value of the outside option among farmers
residing in diﬀerent towns.42 Given that wage does not vary within town, in columns
3a and 3b, table 8, I use information from the Inchiesta Iacini [1881] to group towns
in regions with similar climate and soil characteristics.43
40There are 41 such contracts in the sample. Of these, 11 had olive trees as a secondary crop, 5
had vines and 25 had fruit trees.
41The estimated coeﬃcient is the same if wheat contracts with trees as a secondary crop are
dropped from the sample. The symmetric case (i.e. tree contracts with wheat as secondary crop)
cannot be analysed because there are only 5 such contracts in the sample.
42The wage data was collected only at one point in time during the second half of the decade but
according to the Mayors the wage had hardly changed during the preceding twenty years. Since the
eﬀect of wages on contractual structure is identified from the variation across towns, the wage is a
reasonable measure of the tenants’ alternative option as long as the towns’ relative ranking remained
unchanged during the period analyzed here.
43The three regions are: northeastern coastal (Augusta, Carlentini, Francofonte, Lentini, Sir-
acusa), southeastern coastal (Noto, Pachino, Rosolini) and western interior (Buccheri, Buscemi,
Ferla).
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Caveats notwithstanding, results in columns 3a and 3b indicate that a fall in wage
significantly reduces the probability of observing a fixed rent contract. The marginal
eﬀect of a decrease in wage by one standard deviation is equal to -.04, that is about
one third of the eﬀect of the tenant being middle class, instead of the rich, and about
one fourth of the eﬀect of tenant being poor, again instead of rich.
Endogenous Matching and Other Concerns.
The analysis so far has relied on the assumption that the landlord chooses the
optimal contract for given characteristics of the tenant, or that, in other words,
matching between landlords and tenants is random.
If this were not the case, however, the estimates would be biased. In their study
of tenancy contracts in Renaissance Tuscany, Ackerberg and Botticini [2002] argue
that endogenous matching of tenants and crops can lead to biases in both the crop
and the risk aversion variable when the latter is not observed by the econometrician
and a proxy needs to be used. They find strong evidence of matching, in particular
that poorer tenants are more likely to farm vines instead of cereals. Controlling for
matching changes their estimates considerably, most notably tenant’s wealth becomes
a significant determinant of the choice between sharecropping and fixed rent contracts.
To assess whether matching of tenants and crops is of concern in this setting
I follow Ackerberg and Botticini [2002] and estimate the relationship between crop
type and tenants wealth. Intuitively, if tenants of a given class systematically end
up cultivating a given type of crop, tenants’ class should be significantly correlated
with crop type. Table 9 shows that in this sample there is no correlation between the
two variables. Compared to rich tenants, tenants belonging to the two lowest classes
are neither more likely nor less likely to cultivate a given type of crop. The result
is robust to alternative crop classifications. In column (1) all tree crops are grouped
together and compared to annual crops whereas in column (2) the riskier and more
investment intensive crops (vines and citrus) are compared to annual and other tree
crops. The coeﬃcients of tenant’s social class are not significant in either column,
indicating that in this sample there is no evidence of matching between tenants and
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crops.
Throughout the analysis, the reduced form coeﬃcient of tenant wealth has been
interpreted as a proxy for the cost of providing incentives, either because of risk
aversion or limited liability. Tenants’ wealth, however, might be capturing the eﬀect
of other tenant’s unobservable characteristics. For instance, if wealth were a proxy for
ability, less able, hence poorer, tenants could be oﬀered short term contracts because
landlords would not want to commit long term to a bad tenant. Also, richer, and
hence more able, tenants could prefer to be residual claimants and get a fixed rent
contract. The fact that wealth is coarsely proxied by social class combined with the
fact that social mobility was very low, however, imply that the problem is much less
severe in this context. Indeed, since social class was mostly determined by birth it
is likely to be uncorrelated with innate individual traits, to the extent that these are
randomly distributed across social classes.
Finally, since the landlord chooses both the crop and the contract, landlords
unobserved characteristics might mislead the interpretation of the link between trees
and contractual structure. To the extent that the available information on landlords’
characteristics does not precisely capture the variables of interest, the results could
be due to the residual variation in landlords’ unobservable traits.
For instance, it could be argued that only landlords whose outside opportunity is
very high would rent out trees instead of managing them personally. The observed
correlation between trees and contract length could then be due to a selection bias if,
at the same time, landlords with a higher outside option prefer to save on renegotia-
tion costs and oﬀer long term contracts. The fact that long term contracts are oﬀered
to rich tenants also when they cultivate annual crops however suggests that landlords’
unobservable characteristics are not the sole determinant of contract length.
Information on the other contractual dimension sheds more light on this point.
Based on the argument above, landlords whose outside opportunity is so high that
they prefer to rent out their trees and to oﬀer long term contracts to minimize rene-
gotiation costs should, for the same reasons, avoid share contracts as these need the
landlord to monitor the division of output and to sell her share of the agricultural
produce. The empirical findings, in contrast, indicate that when the tenant is poor
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trees are more likely to be cultivated under share agreements, which is not consistent
with the idea that the link between tree and contract type is due to unobservable
landlords’ characteristics.
6 Conclusions.
This paper uses data on land tenancy agreements to present new evidence on the
empirical determinants of contract form. The main novelty is the availability of
evidence on contract length, an important and yet typically neglected dimension of
contractual structure.
The evidence indicates that long term contracts are used for trees or when the
tenant is rich, while poor tenants who cultivate annual crops are typically oﬀered short
term contracts. Evidence on the determinants of the compensation scheme suggests
that fixed rent contracts are oﬀered when the crop is annual or when the tenant is
rich, while poor tenants who cultivate tree crops are typically oﬀered sharecropping
contracts. In addition, landlords who face higher renegotiation and monitoring costs
are more likely to use long term and fixed rent contracts.
The findings provide evidence on the relevance of asymmetric information and on
the factors that prevent the use of high powered incentives contracts. The fact that
high powered investment incentives, via long term contracts, are always used for trees
which are more sensitive to investment indeed suggests that asymmetric information
plays an important role in contract design. Moreover, that poorer tenants are less
likely to be oﬀered high powered incentives is suggestive of the fact that credit market
imperfections combined with either risk aversion or limited liability make incentive
provision costly.
Importantly, the use of short term contracts and, relatedly, low powered invest-
ment incentives indicates that asymmetric information might eﬀectively lead to less
investment and lower productivity.
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Appendix: Data Sources.
Contracts.
Sample contracts are written by notaries public, who were required by law to store
and bind all contracts they wrote each year. Upon retirement, contracts are stored
at the Notary Archives and eventually transferred to the State Archives. Contracts
in the sample were written by the following notaries and can be found at the State
and Notary Archives in Siracusa, Italy:
State Archives Notary Archives
Notary Name Sample Years Notary Name Sample Years
Baiona, Giovanni Battista 1870-74 Maxeo, Rosario 1875-80
Giarracca, Domenico 1870-77 Perricone, Alessandro 1875-77
Casaccio, Gaetano 1870-72 Tribulato, Antonino 1876
Di Giovanni, Ignazio 1870-75 Amico, Pietro 1870-79
Milito, Virgilio 1870-72 Tribulato Giuseppe 1873-75
Pancari, Vito 1870-75 Santuccio, Francesco 1873-80
Lenares, Giovanni 1872-74 Cultrera, Francesco 1873-75
Motta, Giuseppe 1872-77 Pisana, Pietro 1875-76
Pupillo, Giuseppe 1870-75 Sofia, Luigi 1876-77
Blasco, Francesco 1870-71 Sbano, Francesco 1875-80
Piccione, Rosario 1870-76 Tavana, Eustachio 1876-80
Terranova, Carmelo 1870-77 Nuzzo, Vincenzo 1878-80
Giardina, Gaetano 1870-72 Carbonaro, Raﬀaele 1878-80
Scalia, Gaetano 1878-80
Italia, Francesco 1878-79
Leone, Gaetano 1880
Zivillica, Alfonso 1879-80
Town Variables.
From “Inchiesta Jacini:Atti della Giunta per l’inchiesta agraria e sulle condizioni
della classe agricola 1881” vol XIII, parte I e II, tomo 1-5-rapporto di Abele Damiani
per la Sicilia. Wage data: Book 2 A pages 303 and 311, Crop Revenues Data: Book
2 A pages 298 and 307.
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TABLE 1 DETERMINANTS OF CONTRACTUAL STRUCTURE: IDEAS FROM THEORY
ASSUMPTIONS RELATED VARIABLES  PREDICTIONS
 Long Term (LT) vs. Short 
Term (ST)
Fixed Rent (FR) vs. 
Sharecropping (SC)
Current output depends on the 
tenant's non observable effort.
FR provides stronger incentives for 
production effort.
Crop's sensitivity to effort. Other things equal, FR is more likely to be 
chosen the higher the crop's sensitivity to 
effort and the lower the tenant's cost of effort.
Future output depends on the 
tenant's non observable 
investment effort (e.g. soil and 
plant maintenance).
LT provides stronger incentives 
for investment effort. 
Under multi-tasking, FR provides 
strong incentives for production effort 
at the expense of investment effort.
Crop's sensitivity to investment effort. Other things equal, LT is more likely the 
higher the crop's sensitivity to investment and 
the lower the tenant's cost of investment. 
Because of multitasking, FR is less likely for 
crops that are more sensitive to investment.
Tenant is subject to limited 
liability and credit markets are 
imperfect.
By committing to LT, the 
landlord gives up eviction 
threats as an instrument to elicit 
effort.
Limited liability imposes an upper 
bound to the feasible rent payment in 
a FR contract. SC allows the landlord 
to extract more surplus through state-
contingent payments.
Tenant's wealth, outside option and 
crop's characteristics (difference in 
returns between the good and the bad 
state) determine whether the limited 
liability constraint binds. 
Other things equal, FR/LT is more likely to be 
chosen for rich tenant, for crops with low 
return spread and when the outside option of 
the tenant is high.
Tenant is risk averse and credit 
markets are imperfect.
LT  guarantees employment 
and allows the tenant to smooth 
consumption.
Under FR the tenant bears all the 
risk. SC allows the landlord to extract 
more surplus by insuring the tenant 
against production risk.
Tenant's wealth and crop's riskiness 
determines the trade-off between risk 
and insurance.
Other things equal,  LT is more likely to be 
chosen for poor tenants and risky crops. FR 
is more likely to be chosen  for rich tenants 
and low-risk crops.
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LT entails lower transaction 
costs because ST has to be 
negotiated every year. On the 
other hand, LT reduces 
flexibility.
FR entails lower transaction costs 
because under SC the landlord must 
monitor output measurement and 
division to prevent opportunism.
Landlord's opportunity cost of time 
and flexibility needs.
Other things equal,  LT is more likely to be 
chosen when the landlord's opportunity cost 
of time is high and the need for flexibility is 
low. FR is more likely to be chosen when the 
landlord's opportunity cost of time is high.
CONSEQUENCES FOR CONTRACTUAL STRUCTURE
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PART A: CONTRACTS PART B: CROPS AND CONTRACTS
94 341 194
435 85 520 (36) (76) (78)
(62) (12) (74) 15 70 50
166 19 185 (6) (16) (20)
(24) (3) (26) 137 29 4
601 104 705 (53) (6.5) (2)
(85) (15) (100) 13 6 2
(5) (1.5) (1)
259 196 250
PART C: TENANTS AND CONTRACTS PART D: LANDLORDS AND CONTRACTS
100 176 159 77 28 110 435
(42) (62) (88) (43) (88) (86) (62)
39 34 12 14 2 8 85
(16) (12) (7) (8) (6) (6) (12)
91 68 7 89 2 8 166
(38) (24) (4) (49) (6) (6) (24)
8 8 3 0 0 2 19
(3) (3) (2) (0) (0) (2) (3)
238 286 181 180 32 128 705
absentee aristocrat female
all trees vines & citrus treesannual
long term/fixed rent
long term/ share
long term/fixed rent
long term/fixed rent
long term/ share
short term/fixed rent
short term/share
richpoor middle class
total
short term/share
long term/ share
short term/fixed rent
short term/share
total
short term/fixed rent
long term
short term
all 
landlords
TABLE 2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
total
fixed rent share total
total
 Number in parenthesis are percentages of the total by crop. For 
instance, 36% of annual crop contracts are long term/ fixed rent.
Number in parenthesis are percentages of the total by class. For 
instance, 42% of  contracts with poor tenants are long term/ fixed rent.
Number in parenthesis are percentages of the total by class. For instance, 43% of  
contracts signed by landlords who live in a different town are long term/ fixed rent.
Source: State and Notary Archives, Siracusa, Italy. Volumes and 
years reported in table A1. Numbers in parenthesis are percentages 
of the total sample.
TABLE 3. DETERMINANTS OF CONTRACTUAL STRUCTURE
Bivariate Probit Estimates
Dependent Variables: contract duration (cols. a) and contract type (cols. b)
Standard Errors in parenthesis, marginal effects (evaluated at sample mean) in brackets.
duration type duration type duration type duration type
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
crop is tree 1.61*** -.286** 1.50*** -.379*** 1.39*** -.296* .975*** -.044
(.117) (.125) (.119) (.136) (.132) (.154) (.210) (.211)
[.500] [-.063] [.452] [-.079] [.405] [-.060] [.144] [-.004]
tenant is poor -1.03*** -.621*** -1.02** -.646*** -.547*** -.780***
(.210) (.176) (.219) (.187) (.228) (.207)
[-.314] [-.153] [-.298] [-.153] [-.074] [-.085]
tenant is middle class -.728*** -.375** -.813*** -.380** -.160 -.592***
(.211) (.169) (.226) (.170) (.237) (.187)
[-.208] [-.087] [-.223] [-.084] [-.019] [-.056]
landlord is female .888*** .502*** .635*** .561***
(.213) (.178) (.207) (.208)
[.172] [.088] [.055] [.035]
landlord belongs to the aristocracy 1.04** .476 1.36*** .659*
(.527) (.357) (.471) (.410)
[.161] [.078] [.064] [.033]
landlord lives in a different town -.360*** .458*** -.234 .310
(.137) (.182) (.236) (.213)
[-.100] [.085] [-.029] [.023]
correlation coefficient
wald test, p-value
town controls 
joint F-test, p-value .000 .000
year controls 
joint F-test, p-value .000 .000
joint log likelihood -590.8 -565.2 -537.2 -396.17
no
no
yes
yes
no
no no
no
-.095
.343
.079
.520
-.082
.386
-.098
.315
Notes. Source: see T2. Number of observations is 705 in all specifications. Standard Errors are based on White (1982)'s robust "sandwich" 
estimator for the asymptotic covariance matrix. Marginal Effects are computed as the change in the probability of the positive outcome when 
the variable of interest changes from 0 to 1. The Wald test statistics is the  t ratio of the correlation coefficient squared and has a chi-squared 
distribution with 1 degree of freedom. Omitted categories are: annual  for crop type and rich for tenant's class.*, **, and *** indicates 
significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level.
TABLE 4. MARGINAL EFFECTS ON THE JOINT PROBABILITIES
Bivariate probit estimates from cols. 4a and 4b, Table 4
Marginal effects evaluated at sample mean. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pr(long term,       
fixed rent)
Pr (long term, 
share)
Pr(short term,    
fixed rent)
Pr(short term, 
share) Pr(long term) Pr(fixed rent)
crop is tree .134* .010 -.137** -.006** .144*** -.004
(.069) (.012) (.068) (.003) (.041) (.017)
tenant is poor -.145*** .071* .060 .014** -.074** -.084***
(.052) (.036) (.040) (.006) (.035) (.029)
tenant is middle class -.070* .051* .013 .006** -.019 -.056***
(.036) (.026) (.023) (.003) (.028) (.022)
landlord is female .085*** -.031** -.050* -.004** .055*** .035***
(.029) (.012) (.027) (.002) (.015) (.009)
landlord belongs to the aristocracy .093*** -.029** -.060* -.004** .064*** .033***
(.034) (.014) (.031) (.002) (.012) (.011)
landlord lives in a different town -.007 -.022* .031 -.001 -.029 .023
(.030) (.013) (.028) (.001) (.031) (.014)
town controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
year controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Joint Probabilities Marginal Probabilities
Source: see T.2. Marginal effects are computed from the bivariate probit estimates in cols 4a and 4b, Table 3. Standard Errors are bootstrapped using 1000 
replications.Omitted categories are: annual for crop type and rich for tenant's class. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level.
TABLE 5. DETERMINANTS OF CONTRACTUAL STRUCTURE: INTERACTIONS
Bivariate Probit Estimates
Dependent Variables: contract duration (col 1a) and contract type (cols 1b)
Standard Errors in parenthesis, marginal effects (evaluated at sample mean) in brackets.
(1a) (1b)
crop is tree .472 .528
(.495) (.371)
[.068] [.052]
tenant is poor -1.09** -.224
(.477) (.370)
[-.187] [-.020]
tenant is middle class -.214 -.001
(.478) (.418)
[-.029] [-.001]
crop is tree*tenant is poor .875* -.730*
(.524) (.429)
[.075] [-.095]
crop is tree*tenant is middle class .043 -.764*
(.534) (.473)
[.006] [-.092]
landlord is female .671*** .539***
(.204) (.209)
[.064] [.034]
landlord belongs to the aristocracy 1.34*** .681*
(.467) (.405)
[.072] [.034]
landlord lives in a different town -.161 .313
(.231) (.213)
[-.022] [.023]
test 1, p-value .415
correlation coefficient
wald test, p-value
town controls 
year controls 
joint log likelihood -391.7
.054
.654
yes
yes
Source: see T2. Notes: see T4. The null hypothesis for Test 1 is that the coefficients 
of "tree" and that of "tree*poor" are equal.
TABLE 6 JOINT ESTIMATES OF LENGTH (Continuous) AND TYPE
FIML estimates: joint ordered probit (for length) and probit (for type) estimates
Dependent Variables: contract length (cols. 1a,2a) and contract type (cols. 1b,2b)
Standard Errors in parenthesis.
duration type duration type
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
crop is tree .678*** -.042 .465* .522
(.143) (.211) (.242) (.371)
tenant is poor -.238* -.782*** -.646** -.237
(.130) (.206) (.280) (.372)
tenant is middle class -.018 -.591*** .053 -.002
(.105) (.186) (.277) (.418)
crop is tree*tenant is poor .597** -.714*
(.303) (.431)
crop is tree*tenant is middle class -.094 -.761*
(.293) (.473)
landlord is female -.123  .560*** -.116 .538***
(.106) (.208)  (.105) (.209)
landlord belongs to the aristocracy .687*** .647 .665*** .668*
(.222)   (.407) (.232) (.402)
landlord lives in a different town -.052 .299 -.024 .302
(.141) (.213) (.138) (.213)
correlation coefficient
wald test, p-value
town controls 
year controls 
joint log likelihood
yes
yes
-1248.27
yes
yes
-1241.55
.059
.421
.057
.432
Source: see T2.  Notes: see T4.
TABLE 7. MARGINAL EFFECTS ON DURATION OUTCOMES
7.1 BASIC SPECIFICATION (from column 1a, Table 6)
Pr(d=1) Pr(d=2) Pr(d=3) Pr(d=4) Pr(d=5) Pr(d=6) Pr(d=7) Pr(d=8) Pr(d=9) Pr(d=10)
crop is tree -0.209*** -0.040*** -0.016*** 0.141*** 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.004** 0.008*** 0.006** 0.0017
(0.046) (0.009) (0.006) (0.032) (0.012) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0012)
tenant is poor 0.071* 0.016* 0.008* -0.049* -0.020* -0.018* -0.001 -0.003* -0.002 -0.0006
(0.040) (0.009) (0.004) (0.028) (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0005)
tenant is middle class 0.005 0.001 0.0007 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.031) (0.007) (0.004) (0.021) (0.009) (0.008) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003)
landlord is female 0.037 0.008 0.004 -0.026 -0.011 -0.009 -0.0008 -0.0016 -0.001 -0.0003
(0.033) (0.007) (0.003) (0.023) (0.009) (0.008) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.001) (0.0003)
landlord belongs to the aristocracy -0.149*** -0.054*** -0.051** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.077** 0.008 0.017* 0.016 0.006
(0.034) (0.018) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022) (0.033) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005)
landlord lives in a different town 0.015 0.004 0.002 -0.010 -0.004 -0.004 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0001
(0.041) (0.010) (0.005) (0.028) (0.012) (0.011) (0.0009) (0.0018) (0.001) (0.0004)
7.2 INTERACTIONS (from column 2a, Table 6)
Pr(d=1) Pr(d=2) Pr(d=3) Pr(d=4) Pr(d=5) Pr(d=6) Pr(d=7) Pr(d=8) Pr(d=9) Pr(d=10)
crop is tree -.141* -.030** -.012** .097* .038** .034** .003 .006* .004 .001
(.076) (.014) (.005) (.052) (.019) (.017) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.009)
tenant is poor .201** .038*** .013** -.138** -.051** -.044** -.0036* -.007** -.005* -.001
(.092) (.013) (.006) (.062) (.021) (.018) (.0021) (.003) (.003) (.001)
tenant is middle class -.015 -.004 -.002 .010 .004 .004 .0003 .0007 .0005 .0001
(.080) (.019) (.010) (.054) (.024) (.024) (.0018) (.004) (.0023) (.0007)
crop is tree*tenant is poor -.146*** -.046** -.037 .082*** .055 .059 .005 .012 .010 .003
(.060) (.025) (.025) (.022) (.030) (.038) (.004) (.009) (.008) (.003)
crop is tree*tenant is middle class .028 .006 .003 -.019 -.008 -.007 -.0006 -.001 -.001 -.0002
(.088) (.019) (.009) (.061) (.024) (.021) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.0006)
landlord is female .034 .008 .003 -.024 -.009 -.009 -.0007 -.001 -.001 -.0002
(.032) (.007) (.003) (.022) (.008) (.008) (.0007) (.001) (.001) (.0003)
landlord belongs to the aristocracy -.141*** -.053*** -.047** .068*** .063 .073** .007 .016* .014 .005
(.036) (.019) (.023) (.011) (.022) (.034) (.005) (.009) (.009) (.004)
landlord lives in a different town .007 .001 .0008 -.005 -.073 -.001 -.0001 -.0003 -.0002 -.0001
(.040) (.009) (.005) (.027) (.011) (.010) (.0008) (.001) (.001) (.0003)
Source: see T.2. Marginal effects are computed from the ordered probit estimates in cols 1a and 2a Table 6. Standard Errors are bootstrapped using 1000 replications. Omitted 
categories are: annual for crop type and rich for tenant's class. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level.
TABLE 8. EXTENSIONS AND ALTERNATIVE VARIABLES DEFINITIONS
Bivariate Probit Estimates, Dependent Variables: contract duration (cols. a) and contract type (cols. b)
Standard Errors in parenthesis, marginal effects (evaluated at sample mean) in brackets.
duration type duration type duration type
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
crop is tree 1.17*** -.117
(.200) (.199)
[.261] [-.018]
crop is olive or fruit tree .570*** .301
(.224) (.234)
[.046] [.021]
crop is vines or citrus tree 1.61*** -.319
(.266) (.232)
[.131] [-.028]
crop is tree (either main or secondary) 1.56*** .271
(.214) (.210)
[.265] [.026]
tenant is poor -.537*** -.817*** -.466** -.763*** -.643*** -.783***
(.231) (.205) (.226) (.206) (.218) (.197)
[-.062] [-.086] [-.054] [-.085] [-.136] [-.147]
tenant is middle class -.213 -.562*** -.055 -.596*** -.280 -.618***
(.247) (.189) (.243) (.187) (.231) (.174)
[-.022] [-.051] [-.005] [-.058] [-.054] [-.106]
landlord is female .618*** .583*** .719*** .574*** .511** .651***
(.219) (.214) (.476) (.211) (.208) (.206)
[.044] [.034] [.051] [.037] [.077] [.077]
landlord belongs to the aristocracy 1.57*** .711* 1.42*** .702* .968** .608
(.473) (.407) (.476) (.424) (.489) (.384)
[.054] [.032] [.055] [.035] [.010] [.064]
landlord lives in a different town -.279 .335 -.214 .346 -.439** .323
(.243) (.208) (.239) (.214) (.187) (.209)
[-.031] [.023] [-.024] [.026] [-.093] [.045]
daily wage for adult male casual workers -.601 1.06**
(.636) (.511)
[-.113] [.166]
test 1, p-value .000 .000
correlation coefficient .221 .221 -.012 -.012 .032 .032
wald test, p-value .075 .075 .924 .924 .774 .774
town controls yes yes yes yes no no
region controls no no no no yes yes
year controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
joint log likelihood -377.6 -377.6 -381.7 -381.7 -433.2 -433.2
TABLE 9. MATCHING OF TENANTS AND CROPS
Probit Estimates; Standard Errors in parenthesis.
tenant is poor
tenant is middle class
town controls 
year controls 
log likelihood
crop is tree crop is vines or citrus
-.228
(.193)
.159
(.199)
-.076
(.160)
.194
-211.5 -353.1
(.144)
yes
yes
yes
yes
Source: see T2. The null hypothesis for Test 1 is that the coefficients of "olives and fruit" and that of "vines and citrus" are equal.
Source: see T2. Standard Errors are based on White (1982)'s robust "sandwich" estimator for the asymptotic covariance matrix.
